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Abstract
A raft of United Nations Treaties, European Union Directives and domestic laws oblige
governments in 180 + countries to apply the Participative Democratic Model of main-
streaming equalities to public administration by involving those targeted by equality
initiatives at all stages in their design and delivery. Notwithstanding Participative
Democratic Model’s deeply political nature, extant work has overlooked how governing
party turnover influences civil society organisations’ (CSOs) strategies. Here, this lacuna
is addressed using a negative ‘extreme case study’ research design involving qualitative
accounts from civil society organisations in Wales, a ‘regional’ European polity charac-
terised by one-party dominance. The findings reveal how the absence of turnover
distorts the Participative Democratic Model in relation to diverse factors including:
strategic bridging, extraparliamentary politics, cognitive locks and party institutionalisa-
tion. Inter alia, the wider contribution of this analysis lies in showing the importance of
turnover to effective engagement, the ‘pathologies’ associated with one-party domin-
ance and the need for adaptive civil society strategies tailored to prevailing electoral
politics and governing party turnover in liberal democracies.
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Introduction
This study is concerned with exploring the role of governing party turnover in
shaping participative mainstreaming and civil society organisations’ (CSOs) stra-
tegies for engaging in the work of government. Mainstreaming is an internationally
adopted approach to promoting equality. It is underpinned by a series of United
Nations (UN) conventions and resolutions (e.g. CEDAW, SCR1325, SCR1888 and
SCR1889), as well as European Union (EU) Directives (e.g. 2004/113/EC and
2006/54).1 It has also been enshrined in domestic legal codes (e.g. Equality Act,
2010).2 It came to prominence at the Fourth UN Conference on Women (circa
1995). Since then representatives from 189 countries have adopted the Participative
Democratic Model (PDM) of mainstreaming as set out in the Beijing Declaration
and Platform for Action. Originally conceived as an approach to gender equal-
ity (cf. Beveridge and Shaw, 2002; Woodward, 2008), its application has
broadened to incorporate a full range of characteristics (e.g. age, disability, faith,
ethnicity and sexual orientation). It is concerned with embedding equality into all
stages of public policy making. Crucially, the participative model is based on
engaging groups targeted by equality objectives in their design, development and
implementation.
Notwithstanding its prominence, a burgeoning literature attests to the diﬃcul-
ties of translating mainstreaming principles into practice (cf. Bacchi and Eveline,
2010; Beveridge and Nott, 2002; Caglar, 2013; True and Parisi, 2013; Woehl, 2011).
As Mosesdottir and Erlingsdottir (2005: 525) observe, ‘very few countries have
managed to develop a well-functioning institutional framework around the main-
streaming method’. The UN concurs. Its appraisal of progress since the Beijing
Declaration concluded, ‘many gaps and challenges remain in guaranteeing . . . full
and equal participation in decision-making in all stages’ (UN, 2010: 37).
Mainstreaming is intimately concerned with power and agenda setting – and the
challenging of exclusive norms and the exercise of power by elites unrepresentative
of social diversity. Yet, curiously, existing scholarly work has tended to overlook
its deeply political nature. Instead, past studies have tended to regard government
as a largely non-party-political policy actor. Moreover, extant research has paid
scant attention to the role of electoral politics and governing party turnover (‘turn-
over’ here refers to the rate at which the party holding government oﬃce is voted
out in state-wide elections and replaced by a rival). It is a signiﬁcant knowledge
gap, one that the following discussion addresses.
This study follows a negative ‘extreme case study’ design (for a full discussion,
see Methodology section) and focuses on Wales; a rare and striking example of a
liberal democratic system where governing party turnover is absent – for the coun-
try has experienced single-party dominance throughout the post-war period.
The ﬁndings are based on qualitative data analysis of interviews with civil soci-
ety policy actors. The speciﬁc focus on CSOs is appropriate here because state–
civil society relations lie at the heart of participative mainstreaming. Thus,
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the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (UN, 1995) asserts: ‘civil soci-
ety cooperation with Governments [is] important to the eﬀective implementa-
tion and follow-up of the Platform for Action’ (UN, 1995, Article 20).
In conceptual terms, mainstreaming is based on criticality and engagement
between state and non-state actors. This precludes both the inclusion of civic soci-
ety organisations (because of their connection to the state) – and the private sector
(which is eschewed owing to its concern with capital accumulation/the proﬁt
motive, rather than representing the policy claims of those with ‘protected
characteristics’).
As the following discussion reveals, this study makes three original contribu-
tions: (i) it synthesises diverse strands of social theory and applies them to the PDM
as part of an exploration of how single-party dominance inﬂuences CSOs’ strate-
gies; (ii) it presents the core argument that, although often overlooked, governing
party turnover matters to the PDM for it shapes the political opportunity struc-
tures and attendant CSO strategies for engagement in the work of government; and
(iii) it emphasises that CSOs’ need to employ an adaptive model of policy engage-
ment suited to the prevailing electoral politics and governing party turnover in
liberal democracies. The ﬁndings are presented in relation to four themes emerging
from the data analysis. To guide the reader, these are now brieﬂy summarised and
returned to in detail in the Findings section.
1. In the ﬁrst part of the ﬁndings, social theory in relation to the Collective Interest
Model and strategic bridging is applied to the interview data. This reveals how
OPD skews the political dynamic for participation in the work of government.
Not least it shapes group incentives – as well as whom to engage amongst pol-
itical elites.
2. Subsequently, drawing on theory on action repertoires (or, the means by which
CSOs advance their policy demands), attention centres on the way turnover
distorts the political dynamic for participation. Interviewees allude to
the mixed impact of OPD. Some view the absence of turnover as a pathology,
limiting their policy input. Others see it as a spur to action, a catalyst for
new repertoires to be employed in order to place policy demands on those in
power.
3. Next, theory on framing and ‘cognitive locks’ again underlines how turn-
over shapes engagement. Here the notion of ‘intellectual path depend-
ency shows how, under OPD, CSOs are found to be more constrained in
their use of language. Rather than a free exchange of ideas, interviewees
speak of deliberately advancing claims in ways that align with dominant party
thinking.
4. Finally, theory on policy networks, CSO alliance-building and neo-corporatism
reveals how the disproportionate power of the dominant party distorts collective
action and leads to ‘defensive’ networking amongst CSOs in order to counter the
hegemony of the governing party.
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Attention ﬁrst turns to a summary of the literature on mainstreaming and one-
party dominant systems. In turn, this is followed by an outline of the research
context and methodology, followed by the ﬁndings.
Equalities mainstreaming
Mainstreaming has been described as ‘one of the most rapidly adopted, pro-
gressive social justice-oriented initiatives endorsed by the international commu-
nity in the modern era’ (Chaney and Rees, 2004: 24). The Council of Europe
(2003: 7) deﬁnes it as: ‘the (re)organisation, improvement, development and
evaluation of policy processes, so that an equality perspective is incorporated
in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in
policy-making’. Two broad approaches can be identiﬁed (Barnett Donaghy,
2003; Nott, 2000), the ‘participative-democratic’ (PDM) and ‘expert-bureau-
cratic’ models. The latter is a technocratic method reliant on experts. In con-
trast, the former (and subject of this paper) is predicated on exogenous groups
advancing equality claims on government through active participation and
engagement with civil society (Lister and Carbone, 2006). As Debusscher and
Van der Vleuten (2012: 326) observe, ‘mainstreaming is constructed, articulated
and transformed through discourse, policy-makers carry the responsibility to
push [. . .] equality further by involving civil society and individual activists
promoting [. . .] equality’. ‘Participation’ and ‘engagement’ here can be deﬁned
as the full range of formal and informal means employed by individuals and
groups to inﬂuence the aims, scope, design and implementation of public policy
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). These include protest, boycott, lobbying, petitions
and consultation responses.
As noted, engagement with equalities groups in civil society is a core require-
ment placed on government in a raft of international treaties and directives. It is a
fundamental tenet of the Beijing Declaration: ‘full participation on the basis of
equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making
process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of equality,
development and peace’ (UN, 1995: 3). Subsequently, it has been codiﬁed in no
less than 10 UN resolutions3 (the most recent being in 2010 – Resolution A/RES/
65/191) – as well as a series of EU directives including Council Directives on equal
treatment between persons irrespective of: racial or ethnic origin (2000/43/EC);
religion and belief, disability, sexual orientation and, age (Directive 2000/78/EC);
as well as Sex (Art. 157 TFEU [ex. Art. 141 EC]; Dir. 2006/54/EC and Dir. 2004/
113/EC). It is also detailed in governments’ human rights obligations (e.g. Charter
of Fundamental Human Rights, Art. 21(1) and (2), Art. 23; European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 14; Protocol 12).
Furthermore, it is set out in domestic equalities law. Thus, for example, Fyfe,
Johnston Miller and McTavish (2009: 211) conclude, ‘the Equality Act (2006)
has ﬁrmly positioned gender equality mainstreaming within UK public policy’.
This is evidenced by the requirement on listed authorities to report progress on
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mainstreaming the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act (2010; see
Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2012).4
The foregoing political and legal imperatives have ensured that mainstreaming
has entered the lexicon of policy reform (True and Mintrom, 2001). They have also
underpinned wide-ranging institutional measures in government and beyond (such
as the creation of equality policy units and application of policy tools such as
impact assessments – see Jasquot, 2010; UN, 2010). According to a one UN
survey, 165 member states had some form of ‘national machinery’ for mainstream-
ing by government (Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality, 2005:
61). However, whilst a limited number of studies have underlined the role of pol-
itical context in shaping mainstreaming practice – including the eﬀects of: a hostile
political climate (Nott, 2005), political interpretation and enforcement (Payne,
2011), and the presence of ‘woman-friendly’ administrations (Kim and Kim,
2011), the majority of extant analysis has tended to ignore electoral politics, instead
regarding government as a curiously non-party-political entity.
Governing party turnover and one-party dominant systems
Governing parties’ disposition towards civil society varies across the political spec-
trum; with some favouring authoritarian, ‘top-down’ approaches to public admin-
istration and others coproduction, participation and dialogue (cf. Heritier and
Rhodes, 2011). Accordingly, the type of party elected to form the executive clearly
matters to the PDM and understanding the patterns and processes inﬂuencing
CSOs’ engagement. Such factors also provide an insight into the health of a
given democracy. Thus, as Mair (1996: 84) observes, one can ‘trace sources of
problems of legitimacy and stability of regimes back to the character of their
party systems’. This view is consonant with Huntington’s seminal study (1991)
that emphasised turnover as a key predictor of democratic maturity. Inter alia, it
shapes the circulation of the political elite (Mosca, 1938), openings for new political
leaders, the prevailing political opportunity structures for social interests and the
scope for introducing innovatory practice in public policy and administration.
Moreover, as Jackson (1994: 270) observes, the absence of turnover undermines
democracy. A key gap in the academic literature is whether such assumptions are
supported by empirical data on mainstreaming and CSOs’ policy engagement.
Existing work suggests that a fragmented party system (with comparatively high
rates of governing party turnover) will oﬀer greater political opportunities for
CSOs to advance policy claims on those in power. This is because the attendant
political and electoral vulnerability of parties creates a need to form coalitions
resulting in party elites’ greater ﬂexibility in the face of popular demands
(Saward, 2006). In contrast, strong parties in less fragmented systems are better
placed to disregard civil society claims. To summarise, the distortion of the civil-
society nexus implied by the literature on one-party dominance (OPD) is founded
on (1) diminished legitimacy and accountability (dominant parties have less elect-
oral vulnerability and can ignore/resist popular demands and impose their agendas
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at will); (2) the foregoing limits the political opportunity structures for social inter-
ests; (3) there is less circulation of political elites heightening the problem of veto
players and (4) inﬂuence of the dominant party extends into civil society where
criticality may be compromised as CSOs are reluctant to forego state funding and
patronage.
As Greene (2010: 155) explains, one-party systems are ‘“odd ducks” that incorp-
orate genuine electoral competition with the absence of turnover’. International
examples include Japanese politics 1955–2009 (Inoguchi, 2005) and South African
politics 1994–present (cf. Be´nit-Gbaﬀou, 2012). Far from being an obscure and
unlikely eventuality, all liberal democratic systems have inherent potential for epi-
sodes of OPD. The value of studying an OPD system – as in the present case, is that
it eﬀectively constitutes a control experiment and reveals the role and importance
of turnover to participative democratic mainstreaming. There are varying deﬁn-
itions of what constitutes OPD. In his classic text, Duverger (1954: 308–389) refers
to a dominant party as one whose ‘inﬂuence exceeds all others for a generation or
more [ . . .whose] doctrines, ideas, methods – its style, so to speak, coincide with
those of the epoch’. In like fashion, Butler (2009: 159) notes that OPD:
has been used to refer to the protracted electoral and ideological dominance of a one
party in a representative democracy. It requires, but suggests more than, a series of
electoral successes. OPD implies institutions that translate electoral success into pol-
itical power; the capacity to attract support from substantial electorates over
an extended period; the presence of a unifying historical project; and the ability to
dominate the policy agenda of a country.
Furthermore, Greene (2010: 823) oﬀers a number of deﬁning characteristics of
OPD systems. These include:
holding the premiership, [and] at least a plurality of legislative seats; a longevity
threshold – typically a four election/20 year span; electoral competition must be
meaningful (this entails . . . a legislature that cannot be dismissed by the executive
and who are chosen through regular popular elections, opposition forces that are
allowed to form independent parties and compete in elections, and the incumbent
does not engage in outcome-changing electoral fraud).
As the following discussion reveals, when OPD systems emerge, they distort the
civil society–state nexus, potentially subverting the beneﬁcial democratising elem-
ents of criticality and resource exchange seen in other liberal democracies. In such
instances, as Giliomee and Simkins (1999: 340) note, ‘the vital elements of democ-
racy, namely genuine competition and uncertainty in electoral outcomes, are
removed in a process that is self-sustaining’. The way that this impacts on civil
society engagement with government is a key knowledge gap. It matters because, it
is a core tenet of equalities mainstreaming – as well as pluralist theory (Dahl, 1961).
Both underline how exogenous civil society interests perform a pivotal role through
6 Public Policy and Administration 0(0)
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knowledge transfer, service delivery, and critical engagement as part of the wider
processes of agenda setting and holding government to account. As a result,
OPD has the potential to introduce a range of obstacles to participative main-
streaming – and, crucially, illuminate the role of governing party turnover. Prior
to discussing these, attention ﬁrst turns to the research context.
Research context
As Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2003: 334) note, ‘a devolutionary trend has swept the
world [ . . . involving widespread] transference of power, authority, and resources to
subnational levels of government’. A burgeoning literature attests to the fact that
this is not a uniform process (Krossa, 2011). The rise of meso- or ‘regional’ gov-
ernment across Europe and beyond is characterised by contrasting powers and
levels of autonomy being transferred to regions within UN-recognised unitary
states (Heritier and Rhodes, 2011). The UK is no exception. State decentralisation
(or devolution) in 1998–1999 moved the UK further down the constitutional path
towards being a (quasi-)federal state. The (re-)establishment of legislatures for
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (circa 1998/1999) has accentuated diver-
gence of the prevailing legal and policy frameworks applying to CSOs in the
four constituent UK polities. It has also resulted in contrasting institutional
arrangements for engagement with government (cf. Birrell, 2012). Crucially, it
has meant civil society–state relations have been shaped by territorially speciﬁc
patterns and processes of meso-level politics.
As in other international contexts, the UK has adopted an asymmetrical model
of devolution. Although initially possessing the weakest set of powers, the Welsh
‘settlement’ is the one that has seen most change. No less than three devolution
statutes have been passed by Westminster since 1998, each transferring further
signiﬁcant policy responsibilities to Wales (including health, housing, social ser-
vices, economic development and education). Moreover, the National Assembly
for Wales gained primary legislative powers in 2011 and the latest Act (in 2014) set
out tax-raising powers. This is an ongoing process. The UK government has com-
mitted to further change following Commission on Welsh devolution in 2014 that
recommended the devolution of further competencies, including policing, youth
justice and devolution in the courts system and judiciary. These developments
place regional government in Wales broadly on a par with other legislative regions
across Europe and beyond.
The present locus of enquiry is propitious because, over the past 150 years,
Welsh politics has been characterised by OPD. Throughout the second half of
the 19th century, Wales experienced one-party domination under the Liberal
Party (Morgan, 1981). Following a brief interregnum, since 1945 the Labour
Party has been the preeminent political force (Hopkin, Tanner and Williams
2001; McAllister, 1980). Having secured 58.6% of the vote in the 1945 election,
it has gained a majority of Welsh Members of Parliament in all subsequent ballots
(and often an absolute majority of Welsh votes). Notably, in electoral terms, the
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other main UK state-wide party, the right-of-centre Conservative Party, has fared
worse in Wales than in England at every general election since the 1800s.
Moreover, following devolution, Labour’s pre-eminence is underlined by the fact
that it has always gained the largest share of the vote. In 1999, it won 28 of the
60 seats in the National Assembly for Wales (polling 37.6% of the vote, 9.4% more
than their nearest rivals). In the next three ballots, the party won exactly half of the
seats in the legislature – the same as its three main rivals combined (with 40% of the
vote in 2003, 32.2% in 2007 and 36.9% in 2011). This record has ensured that
Labour has continuously held government oﬃce since the National Assembly for
Wales was created in 1999.5
Methodology
The following discussion is based upon qualitative semistructured interview data
gathered from a series of studies spanning the period 1999–2015.6 The analysis is
aligned with phenomenological and interpretive paradigms. The emphasis is on
constructivist analysis; speciﬁcally, understanding policy actors’ social construc-
tions of interaction with government (see, e.g. Cassell and Symon, 1994: 2).
Thus, as Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 8) observe, qualitative exploratory case
study analysis ‘implies an emphasis on the qualities of entities and on processes
and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured in terms of quan-
tity, amount, intensity, or frequency’. Accordingly, the quotations presented in the
ﬁndings below are illustrative of key themes emerging from the data where the aim
is to explore and examine policy actors’ views and experiences.
The adopted methods provided a singular longitudinal perspective of the entire
period of meso-governance since constitutional reform in the UK in 1998–1999. As
noted, the UN policy framework (UN, 1995) states that the PDM of mainstreaming
is predicated on government/state engagement with civil society. Accordingly, a
purposive sample of 103 interviews was conducted with policy actors from CSOs
(managers, coordinators and project workers), representing a cross-section of ‘pro-
tected characteristics’. The sample comprised seven CSOs concerned with gender
equality, six ethnicity, eight disability, six age, two sexual orientation, three faith and
ﬁve generic equalities. In turn, the number of interviewees for each characteristic
broadly reﬂects the number of representative CSOs for each group as listed in the
oﬃcial third sector register of CSOs (Wales Council for Voluntary Action, 2014).
The interviews were based on an interview schedule consisting of core questions
developed from leading texts on mainstreaming (see ‘References’). The use of a
basic interview framework – or standardised set of research stimuli, allowed com-
parison of participants’ accounts. Semistructured interviews were particularly
suited to the present task because they permitted the use of probes and secondary,
supplementary questions (King and Horrocks, 2010). This boosted reliability of the
data by enabling the exploration and clariﬁcation of the issues and experiences
described by participants. The theoretical framework underpinning the schedule
was participative democratic mainstreaming – as well as the literature on
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deliberative democracy (cf. Elster, 1998; Gutman and Thompson, 2004). Topics
covered included action repertoires, mobilising structures, networking, communi-
cation, information, awareness, resource issues, access, inﬂuence, knowledge, skills
and human capital. Interviews were transcribed and analysed using appropriate
software. A deductive approach to analysis was used in order to allow the data to
‘speak’ for themselves without the imposition of predetermined coding categories
(Boyatzis, 1998). Care was taken to minimise interviewer bias through use of a
general interview schedule. Moreover, care was taken to uphold objectivity when
asking supplementary or follow-up questions. This methodological framework
allowed triangulation, in other words, comparison of emerging themes and issues
across ‘protected characteristics’ (i.e. between CSOs representing women, disabled
people, ethnic minorities and so on).
In terms of case study selection, Wales was chosen because it provides a rare and
striking example where governing party turnover is absent. It is a liberal demo-
cratic system that has experienced single-party dominance throughout the entire
postwar period. It is therefore ideally suited to an exploratory, negative ‘extreme
case study’ research design (Gerring, 2004; Jahnukainen, 2010: 89). This is used to
address the principal research question: ‘How does single-party dominance inﬂu-
ence CSOs’ engagement strategies’?7 As the research methods literature attests,
an ‘extreme case study’ is apposite ‘when the objective is to achieve the greatest
possible amount of information on a given problem or phenomenon, [in such cir-
cumstances] a representative case or a random sample may not be the most appro-
priate strategy. This is because the typical or average case is often not the richest in
information. Atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information’ (Flyvbjerg,
2006: 222). Seawright and Gerring (2008: 298) concur with this assessment:
the extreme case approach to case study analysis is therefore a conscious attempt to
maximize variance on the dimension of interest, not to minimize it . . . is a purely
exploratory method—a way of probing possible causes or possible eﬀects of in an
open-ended fashion.
Attention now turns to the research ﬁndings. Four sets of factors – or ‘spheres’
were identiﬁed by interviewees as inﬂuencing how governing party turnover aﬀects
the PDM of mainstreaming under single-party dominance8: collective interest rep-
resentation and strategic bridging, action repertoires, framing and cognitive locks
and CSO networking and alliance building (Figure 1). Each is discussed in turn.
Research findings: The influence of governing party turnover
on CSOs’ strategies
Collective interest and strategic bridging
This ﬁrst section of the ﬁndings reveals how OPD skews the political dynamic for
participation in the work of government. Not least it shapes group incentives – as
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well as whom to engage amongst political elites. As Payne (2011: 528) cogently
observes, mainstreaming has both coercive and voluntary elements. Governments
may variously be seen to ‘coerce’ CSOs into policy engagement through the impos-
ition of structural arrangements, reporting mechanisms and resource dependency.
Whereas on the voluntaristic side of the equation, CSOs’ are proactive, independ-
ent policy actors concerned with placing their own demands on government.
Interviewees’ comments suggest OPD shifts the accent towards the coercive side
of the equation. This can be seen with reference to the Collective Interest Model
(Finkel et al., 1998: 39) which outlines three categories of group incentives for
engaging with those in power: (1) ‘high levels of discontent with the current pro-
vision of public goods by the government or regime’, (2) the belief ‘that collective
eﬀorts can be successful in providing desired public goods’ and (3) the belief that
CSO- state 
engagement
(i). Strategic 
bridging
Collective interest 
factors
(iii). Action 
repertoires
cycles of 
contention
(iv). CSO 
networking & 
alliance building,
'blurred 
boundaries' 
informal politics
(ii). Framing & 
cognitive locks
Path dependency
Party 
institutionalization
Figure 1. Turnover-related factors influencing civil society organisations’ engagement
strategies.
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CSOs ‘own participation will enhance the likelihood of the collective eﬀort’s suc-
cess’. Each of these resonates with equality claims making under the PDM and
each is mediated by turnover. In turn, this skews the overall political dynamic for
CSOs’ participation in the work of government. Further understanding of precisely
how this happens can be gained using the concept of ‘strategic bridging’ (Tilly,
1978: 125–133). This is a concept highlighting individual agency and engagement
between policy actors in civil society and parliamentarians (see also Gamson,
1975). Crucially, CSOs’ collective interests are shown to be modiﬁed by turnover.
This shapes targeted lobbying of individual ministers and backbenchers in order to
advance equalities claims. This is because, when participating in government policy
making, CSOs are faced with the strategic choice of whom to engage amongst a
given parliamentary cohort. This is where OPD creates a singular political dynamic
for participative mainstreaming. Notably, the present research data show how it
reduces the value of alliance building with opposition party members. The reason
for this being that they are ‘devalued’ – or viewed as less inﬂuential owing to the
fact that (compared to ‘regular’ turnover liberal democracies), they are less likely to
hold future government oﬃce.
Thus, when asked about how OPD aﬀected the targeting of parliamentarians,
one respondent said
when I started [to work for the CSO] a colleague said to me ‘you’ll learn – opposition
parties might be more willing to cooperate but go after Labour [i.e. the dominant
party]’ . . . and I was all principled and that . . .No I’ll speak to them all – but he was
right . . .Obviously we still try and work with the others [opposition parties] but, in
terms of pay-oﬀ, the priority has to be Labour . . . It just has.
The associated pattern of CSO (dis-)engagement with opposition parliamentar-
ians has worrying implications. Not least, it may further comprise attempts at
PDM (– and democracy more widely) over future electoral cycles – for CSOs’
continued emphasis on engagement with the dominant party further strengthens
its power and inﬂuence at the expense of opposition parties. Allied to the foregoing,
in terms of strategic bridging, the present data also reveal that turnover not only
shapes which parties CSOs engage – but also whom they engage in a given parlia-
mentary cohort. Speciﬁcally, governing party turnover aﬀects participatory main-
streaming through the existence of veto players. These are parliamentarians who,
by virtue of their oﬃce, may block exogenous claims making by CSOs on issues like
equalities (Tsebelis, 1995). Veto players may be unreceptive to mainstreaming
claims for a variety of reasons including political ideology, laissez faire orientation,
or discriminatory attitudes. Crucially, their inﬂuence is heighted under OPD as
they are less likely to be replaced by a change of government following an election.
Instead, they have enduring inﬂuence and may eﬀectively block CSO claims over
successive election cycles. Thus, for example, the chief executive of a lesbian,
gay and bisexual peoples’ CSO alluded to how a prominent politician had rejected
policy demands from the organisation when holding one ministerial portfolio – and
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had subsequently frustrated the CSO’s lobbying on a another matter when later
appointed to a diﬀerent ministry: ‘our hearts sank when we heard [named minister]
had got it [the health portfolio in a cabinet reshuﬄe] . . .we had a clear indication of
the way things were likely to go from the last time . . . ’
Overall, the present ﬁndings align with the wider international experience of
lobbying (e.g. Pare´s, Bonet-Martı´ and Martı´-Costa, 2011); yet, hitherto the con-
nection with PDM has not been stated. It is worth reﬂecting on the practical
implications of this ﬁnding. It suggests that CSOs need to adapt their strategic
bridging so that their targeted lobbying of individual ministers and backbenchers is
aligned with governing party turnover – and where appropriate, compensates for
OPD by deliberate engagement with weaker opposition parties. Failure to do this
will reduce the value of alliance building with opposition party members, increase
the power of veto players in dominant parties – and further the party politicisation
of claims making. In turn, this will lead to a downward spiral, thereby increasing
likelihood of OPD over time and bringing with it associated negative consequences
for the PDM.
Action repertoires
This aspect of the ﬁndings provides further insight into how turnover skews the
political dynamic for participation. As the following reveals, interviewees variously
allude to OPD as a pathology limiting their policy input and as a catalyst for
new repertoires to place policy demands on those in power. Thus, under the
PDM of mainstreaming once CSOs decide to advance equality claims on
those in power, they must choose the method or means by which to advance
their policy demands. The options constitute CSOs’ ‘action repertoires’
(see Tilly, 1995: 42). The full gamut of claims-making methods open to CSOs is
diverse. At one end of the spectrum lies protest and civil disobedience, whilst more
bureaucratised means (such as policy lobbying and consultation work) are at
the other.
Crucially for participative mainstreaming, CSOs’ action repertoires shift over
election cycles and are shaped by the type of party holding government oﬃce.
A change of governing party is often the catalyst for new repertoires to be
employed – or for existing ones to be revised. It is a cyclical view of mainstreaming
participation, whereby repertoires are shaped in the context of peaks or cycles of
protest activity or ‘cycles of contention’ (Tarrow and Tilly, 2001). The present
ﬁndings suggest that governing party turnover determines the degree to which
party institutionalisation sets in. This can be deﬁned as ‘the process by which a
practice or organization becomes well-established and widely known, if not uni-
versally accepted. In consequence actors develop expectations, orientations, and
behaviour based on the premise that this practice or organization will prevail into
the foreseeable future’ (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995: 4). It is a situation that
resonates with the notion of ‘path dependency’ in (neo-)institutionalist theory.
As Pierson and Skocpol (2002: 6) explain, this refers to: ‘the dynamics of self-
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reinforcing or positive feedback processes in a political system . . . [involving] mech-
anisms that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future . . . ’
Interviewees oﬀered contrasting views of the impact of OPD on CSOs’ action
repertoires. Some indeed supported the idea of ‘path dependency’ and alluded to
how party institutionalisation under OPD had a stiﬂing eﬀect on participative
mainstreaming. Accordingly, one policy oﬃcer
it can get a bit stale if you know what I mean . . . the best way to be heard is to link-in
with Labour [Party] ‘spads’ [special advisors] to ministers and senior oﬃcials . . . [but]
it can get a bit like Groundhog Day,9 mind . . .
In contrast, others underlined how the diminished political opportunity struc-
tures under OPD had a galvanising eﬀect on engagement based on the necessity for
a broad repertoire of protest and mobilisation. For example, one said ‘you have to
work round it if you like . . . for us we’ve tried to engage young people [and] encour-
age them [to use] social media campaigns . . . it’s just that thing of sort of trying to
get round that political roadblock’. Another opined,
We’ve tried all the conventional ways, consultations and the like . . . it always seems to
fall on deaf ears as it were, either they don’t hear us or they don’t want to hear us.
Most likely both! . . . after the last one [i.e. election] and they [the Labour Party] got in,
we said this has gotta change . . .we’ve got to step it up, [and] that when it started
really [series of campaigns]. I have to say, I think we were slow really . . .We were a bit
snail-like in realising they [Labour government] are going nowhere [i.e. they’ll remain
in oﬃce over election cycles] it forces you to reconsider . . . [To] up the ante.
These ﬁndings resonate with the wider participation literature (e.g. work in
Catalonia; see Font and Galais, 2011). In terms of the practical implications for
CSOs, the current ﬁndings show that even when denied the catalysing eﬀect of
regular government turnover, CSOs need to be proactive, vary their action reper-
toires and employ the full gamut of claims-making methods. This is to
ward against party institutionalisation, maximise criticality and advance claims
making on government in order to challenge existing power relations in policy
making.10
Framing and cognitive locks
Drawing upon theory on policy framing and ‘cognitive locks’, the following fur-
thers understanding of how single-party dominance shapes civil society engage-
ment. Speciﬁcally, under OPD, ‘intellectual path dependency’ asserts itself and
CSOs are found to be more constrained in their use of language. Rather than a
free exchange of ideas, interviewees spoke of deliberately framing claims in ways
that aligned with dominant party thinking. Frames here are a psycholinguistic
means of ‘selecting, organizing, interpreting and making sense of a complex reality
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to provide guideposts for knowing, analysing, persuading, and acting’ (Rein and
Schon 1993: 146). Social theory (Snow and Benford, 1992: 137) underlines how
CSOs can ‘strategically frame’ issues such as equalities policy demands in order
that they ﬁt – or resonate – with the dominant frames held by other policy actors,
including government. As Pollack and Hafner-Burton, (2000: 435) explain, those in
power are ‘more likely to adopt new frames that are resonant, rather than in con-
ﬂict, with their existing dominant’ frames’. A surface reading might suggest that
OPD would make CSOs’ task easier. Ergo, in a ‘regular’ liberal democratic system
government is constantly changing over election cycles, therefore one might expect
a need for CSOs to consistently vary framing practices to align with the political
complexion of those in power. However, respondents alluded to the speciﬁc chal-
lenges posed by OPD. In the present case study, the Labour Party has placed
strong rhetorical emphasis on a policy discourse of ‘traditional’ socialism (in con-
trast to more centrist interpretations of social democracy held by the UK Labour
Party at Westminster). For example, it has featured the tropes of mutuality, equal-
ity of outcome and redistribution (Chaney and Drakeford, 2004). Accordingly, one
interviewee alluded to how they had deliberately linked equality of opportunity
claims with (government) aspirations for tackling income inequalities. This was
done in order to align the CSO’s framing with one of the dominant frames in
the governing party discourse. She recalled how they had pressed a minister and
his team on gender budgeting with limited success. Subsequently, she alluded
to how:
We had this rethink . . .OK, we know they were [i.e. government minister] not overly
keen . . . [That is an] understatement! I think there was a concern with [the potential
cost of] equal pay claims in local government, anyway . . .we thought [if] we pitch it in
terms of the economic aspect – ‘Clear Red Water’, Classic Labour – all that [references
to a notable First Minister’s speech stating the party’s socialist governing principles]
and the tackling poverty agenda [a key policy goal of the governing party] . . . and it
was after that there was the pilot [scheme] . . . its easy after the event I know – but I do
think the change of language on our part helped”.
An allied ﬁnding is the way that governing party turnover – and thus party
institutionalisation – may shape mainstreaming practices through ‘cognitive
locks’. The latter represent what Forestiere and Allen (2011: 381) term ‘intellectual
path dependency in policymaking’. Once established, they become a guiding set of
ideas or ‘ideological mantra to be repeated and applied no matter . . . [what] the
actual conditions of a situation’ (Blyth, 2002: 229). They are particularly evident
under one-party dominant regimes because change or reversal of government poli-
cies as a result of exogenous pressure – what Hirschman (1970: 30) calls ‘voice’ – is
limited or absent. As noted, in the present case study, the dominant Labour Party
has long espoused a socialist ideology and a generally rejected mixed economy
approaches to welfare involving the private sector. Against this background, the
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manager of a disabled people’s CSO gave an example of an ideologically grounded
cognitive lock:
we asked her [the minister] . . . if the only way to ensure the service was to contract out
[i.e. to a private company] rather than face a total loss [of provision] . . . our members
would back that . . . she wasn’t having it. No way . . .We were told in no uncertain
terms there was no place for that route . . .we [the CSO] weren’t happy with it – but
we’d thought about it pragmatically and felt it’d be better than nothing . . . they were
not having it’.
The present ﬁndings also reveal the party politicisation of engagement. Thus,
interviewees underlined how they were obliged to negotiate the challenging and
singular positional politics that characterise a one-party dominant system.
Compared to ‘regular’ liberal democracies, the key diﬀerence is the absence of
turnover means CSOs are consistently pitted against the same party, thereby
strengthening the appearance of partisanship – wherein criticism of government
may become conﬂated with criticism of party qua party. It is a viewpoint captured
by the following interviewee:
My personal view is the fact that it is a one party state actually does create quite a
sterile environment in terms of policy-making. It very much feels that at times to
challenge a policy is very much to challenge the [Labour] Party, and to challenge
the hegemony of the Welsh Labour Government.
Another policy oﬃcer said: “it can get a bit ‘political’ at times . . . someone from
the [policy network] said to me . . . ‘why are you giving Labour a hard time’? [i.e. the
viewpoint they are on our side] – but that’s not the point, is it? It’s the government
you’re dealing with’. Overall, these ﬁndings show that on a deliberative level, CSOs
not only need to strategically frame their demands so as to align with the discourse
of the dominant party – they also need to frame them in ways consonant with
opposition parties’ discourse in order to facilitate broad-based, cross party engage-
ment and lessen dominant party institutionalisation, as well as overcome cognitive
locks.
CSO networking and alliance building
This section of the ﬁndings applies theory on policy networks, CSO alliance build-
ing and neo-corporatism to reveal how, under OPD, the disproportionate power of
the dominant party distorts collective action and leads to ‘defensive’ networking
amongst CSOs in order to counter the hegemony of the governing party. The
theoretical backdrop to this is that networks and mobilising structures sustain
collective action in civil society (McAdam et al., 1996: 13). Taken together,
they are the means for interorganisational coordination and collaboration
Chaney 15
XML Template (2015) [28.4.2015–9:15am] [1–25]
//blrnas3.glyph.com/cenpro/ApplicationFiles/Journals/SAGE/3B2/PPAJ/Vol00000/150007/APPFile/SG-
PPAJ150007.3d (PPA) [PREPRINTER stage]
between CSOs. Interviewees’ comments reveal how participatory mainstreaming is
aﬀected by single-party dominance. Speciﬁcally, the fact that the dominant party is
unlikely to be voted out of oﬃce diminishes its propensity to compromise its policy
agenda in the face of CSOs’ mainstreaming claims. In turn, this may further
weaken and disadvantage ‘standalone’ organisations who, even in ‘regular’ liberal
democracies, are often easier for political elites to sideline or defeat compared to
coordinated action from multiple networked CSOs (cf. Banazak, 2010). The dis-
proportionate power of the dominant party under OPD strengthens the incentives
for CSOs to eﬀectively seek ‘strength in numbers’ and coordinate when engaging
with government (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). This is evident in the present
study. For example, an interviewee alluded to how CSOs representing individual
equalities ‘strands’ (e.g. gender, disability, ethnicity and so on) had decided to unite
to produce a manifesto of equalities demands spanning protected characteristics.
The underlying rationale was that it would aﬀord them greater inﬂuence over the
dominant party’s programme in the run-up to national elections:
We’d seen what had happened on [the previous election commitment by the dominant
party to] ‘free’ social care [the party did a U-turn, widely seen as reneging] . . . this was
a terrible betrayal of disabled people . . .We thought right! So, yes, we did sign-up to
the [Equalities] Manifesto . . . our Exec[utive] Committee said we must make sure that
it [government ‘betrayal’] doesn’t happen again, so having everyone on-board
[i.e. coordinated claims-making by CSOs] ticks that box . . . shifts the balance . . . [of
power with the governing party].
The current study also reveals the impact of single-party dominance and neo-
corporatism. As Mansbridge (1999: 495) explains, the latter as an approach that
‘values interest groups as ongoing institutional mechanisms for representing inter-
ests not easily represented in the territorial representative process. [And] it attempts
to bring the laissez faire system of interest representation partly under public con-
trol’. In the current research context, neo-corporatism takes the form of state-
sponsored policy networks. Whilst undoubtedly facilitating engagement, its
use can also be emblematic of the coercive aspect of mainstreaming (cf. Payne,
2011: 528).
Accordingly, CSOs’ proximity to power elites under neo-corporatism may
undermine their autonomy and criticality, thereby compromising their independ-
ence (Korolczuk, 2014; Mansbridge, 1999). Thus, as De Jager (2005: 56) explains:
civil society derives its very legitimacy from its ability to act and then to act
independently . . .The development of more formal and regulated civil society–state
relations may subvert the character of civil society and compromise its role in enhan-
cing democracy.
Whilst this concern is germane to liberal democracies in general, interviewees’
comments attest to its heightened signiﬁcance under OPD because of the increased
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power of political patronage stemming from power centred on a single party.11
Thus, the director of a CSO reﬂected: ‘we don’t want to alienate [ministers] but also
we don’t want to be in the pocket of the minister and it’s that balance which is
diﬃcult’. Another oﬀered candidly: ‘we are afraid to say “the emperor has no
clothes”12 . . .we are afraid to show when failure is happening, because you know
you have several people that have to wear several hats [i.e. perform multiple roles
as CSO representatives and members of government policy task and ﬁnish groups,
and recipients of state funding], there are conﬂicts of interest . . . ’Another manager
alluded to how OPD even limited CSOs’ willingness to provide information to
assist opposition backbenchers in criticising government policy. This is because
its specialist nature meant its provenance would be clear (and in turn likely to be
viewed as an overt attack on government, their chief sponsor). One manager said,
‘it can misﬁre . . . having the right points advanced by the “wrong party”’ – er,
[irony] it doesn’t always advance your cause!’. Another reﬂected on the overall
impact of OPD and neo-corporatist practices:
In eﬀect you now have state sponsored civil society which compounds the problem
that it’s hard to criticise government. So they’ve created a civil society but it’s an
anaemic one because they control the ﬂow of blood and they don’t want it [civil
society] to get too strong.
Whilst extant work often points to political parties and civil society as largely
discrete entities (cf. Chatterjee, 2004: 136; Kopecky and Mudde, 2003), single-party
dominance highlights blurred boundaries (cf. Mair, 2000) and how this may impact
on participative mainstreaming. Under OPD holding power over successive elec-
tion cycles eﬀectively institutionalises the dominant party. It regularises and sus-
tains contacts between government and civil society over extended periods of time
(‘boundary blurring’) – whereas such relationships and interaction would be swept
away by a new party being elected to power in regular turnover democracies. As
Be´nit-Gbaﬀou (2012: 186) explains, the resultant overlapping of government and
civil society spheres aﬀects participative mainstreaming by limiting CSOs’ critical-
ity towards the governing party. This can be prompted by a range of reasons –
including citizens’ loyalty to the party as well as a shared sense of identity and/or
ideology. It may also be due to the dominant party ‘exert[ing], through its mem-
bers, a subtle but eﬃcient social control on what is said . . . it may [also] be shaped
by everyone’s perception that their discourse and position might be reported to
[party] structure’ (Be´nit-Gbaﬀou, 2012: 191).
The latter point is supported by the present ﬁndings for interviewees spoke of
‘toning down’ or avoiding criticism of government for fear that some CSO man-
agers – who were also members of the dominant party, convey their comments to
ministers; which in turn could jeopardise their government funding. According one,
“you do have to stop yourself. . . . I thought hold-on [uses own name] watch your-
self! ‘cos I know a couple of policy people there are strong Party [people]”.
A further, related issue is that mainstreaming may be undermined by the negative
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aspects (opaqueness, lack of accountability and exclusive nature) of informal net-
works that crosscut formal political channels and processes (Masket, 2009). This
corresponds with existing work by McClurg and Lazer (2014: 4) who explicate how
party organizations, interest groups and others in the policy process . . . often form
connections that are at times ﬂuid and at other times enduring . . . suggest[ing] a host
of new substantive questions about organized inﬂuence in politics that centred on
explaining relationship formation and impact in political organizations.
Thus, interviewees described how critical engagement with government routinely
took place outside legislative channels. In other words, OPD was “short circuiting”
the formal practices of parliamentary representation and instead operating as an
informal, intraparty process. One interviewee said: ‘we are not going in from a zero
baseline. Our existing contacts and connections are very important. There are ‘soft
targets’ in the [National] Assembly’. Another echoed this by making the point that,
‘you have to be in the right groups or else you will get marginalised. You have to
network’. According to another CSO manager, “some of the civil service they
are very much steeped in the old ways, the Whitehall approach . . . and that’s
where we’ve had to make representations, you know, through political
channels . . . ”Another added:
I found where we have had some successes is in raising concerns with Labour back-
benchers who have gone on to raise the concerns themselves with ministers. So we
tend to shape the policy practices indirectly through the Labour Party machine itself,
shaping policy internally. I think there’s more chance of a Labour backbencher getting
concessions out of a [Labour] minister than engaging opposition parties “from the
outside.”
A further issue is the way that OPD may increase division and mistrust between
equalities CSOs. This is because the greater powers of government patronage in
OPD systems may create two classes of CSO – ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Taylor,
2001), thereby accentuating conﬂict and tensions between equalities strands
(e.g. Siim, 2007). Thus, for example, one CSO chief executive said
we have this situation where – when it comes to disabled people [named organisation]
are widely seen by the minister as the representative body . . . Something, obviously,
they have done nothing to disabuse . . .We may be [a] small [CSO] but . . . I mean,
eﬀectively, y’ know we are crowded out . . .
In a broadly similar vein, another interviewee said
it all really comes down to who speaks for [ethnic minority] communities . . . now
[named umbrella body] are funded by the government, right? They know how to
play the game . . . they’re not going to press the minister hard; truth told, they are
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not going to press the minister! [laughs] . . . [named equality body] said ‘why aren’t you
members’? [of the umbrella body]. Look, there’s no way our people would have it.
We’re not becoming part of that charade.
In summary, the practical signiﬁcance of these ﬁndings for CSOs is that in
placing their equalities claims on government they need to utilise mobilizing struc-
tures to develop advocacy coalitions that act to counter the disproportionate power
and inﬂuence of dominant parties. Such alliances oﬀer a way to address the com-
promised independence that can result from dominant party patronage and neo-
corporatist structures. In other words, by creating alliances that are broader than
state-sponsored CSOs, full criticality may be restored.
Conclusion
The foregoing empirical analysis reveals that single-party dominance inﬂuences
CSOs’ engagement strategies by shaping the prevailing political opportunity struc-
tures and attendant CSO strategies for participation in the work of government.
Instead of adapting their Modus operandi to take account of governing party turn-
over as happens in ‘regular’ liberal democracies, the current data show how single-
party dominance distorts civil society policy engagement. The analysis identiﬁes
four areas aﬀected by the absence of turnover: strategic bridging, action reper-
toires, framing and cognitive locks, and CSO networking and alliance building.
Thus, interviewees’ comments attest to how OPD skews the ‘political dynamic’ for
participation by aﬀecting group incentives. Moreover, attention to strategic brid-
ging reveals how single-party dominance inﬂuences whom to engage amongst the
political elite. Whilst reference to CSOs’ action repertoires also reveals how some
view the absence of turnover as a pathology that limits policy input. In addition,
the application of social theory on framing and ‘cognitive locks’ illustrates how,
under OPD, CSOs are more constrained in their use of language. Rather than a free
exchange of ideas, interviewees speak of deliberately advancing claims in ways that
align with dominant party thinking. Furthermore, conceptual work on policy net-
works and neo-corporatism underlines how the disproportionate power of the
dominant party distorts collective action and leads to ‘defensive’ networking
amongst CSOs in order to counter the hegemony of the governing party.
Thus, far from being an apolitical, bureaucratic, instrumental undertaking, the
operationalisation of mainstreaming principles around participation and democ-
racy is shown to be shaped by electoral politics. As the principal policy actor bound
by international and domestic mainstreaming obligations, government is not a
constant in the mainstreaming equation. Rather, its political complexion changes
each time a governing party is voted out and replaced by a rival. Accordingly, the
type of party holding oﬃce shapes a broad range of factors including: the power of
the incumbent, the degree of openness or resistance to exogenous criticality and
claims making, the extent of political patronage and the degree of CSO resource
dependency and autonomy.
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A key point emerging from the study is that the nondiscrete issues identiﬁed are
self-sustaining. Over time, diminished civil society engagement with opposition
parties will further strengthen the dominant party and thus perpetuate a downward
spiral such that a change of governing party is even less likely. This provides a
salutary lesson for the 180+ liberal democracies subscribing to mainstreaming. To
counter such problems, CSOs’ need to employ adaptive action repertoires for par-
ticipative mainstreaming. These should be broad based and cross-party in nature.
For example, they may include the modiﬁcation of strategic bridging to compen-
sate for OPD through deliberate engagement with weaker opposition parties.
Moreover, they may use their mobilising structures to develop advocacy coalitions
to counter the compromised independence that can result from dominant party
patronage and neo-corporatist structures. Through such measures, full criticality in
state–civil society relations may be restored. Overall, the wider contribution of this
study to understanding civil society engagement is threefold: (1) It reveals the types
of problems that may emerge in relation to PDM when a governing party retains
power over several electoral cycles, (2) It underlines the need for contemporary
academic analysis to be cognizant of how Participatory Democratic Mainstreaming
is contingent on electoral competition and governing party turnover, and (3) As
noted, it emphasises that CSOs’ need to employ an adaptive model of policy
engagement suited to the prevailing electoral politics and governing party turnover
in liberal democracies.
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Notes
1. Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal
treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri¼CELEX:32004L0113 and http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri¼CELEX:32006L0054 (accessed 2 January
2014).
2. See section 4, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/sdsi/2011/9780111012215/contents (accessed
20 January 2015).
3. 2001/41 of 26 July 2001, 2002/23 of 24 July 2002, 2003/49 of 24 July 2003, 2004/4 of 7 July
2004, 2005/31 of 26 July 2005, 2006/36 of 27 July 2006, 2007/33 of 27 July 2007, 2008/34
of 25 July 2008 and 2009/12 of 28 July 2009.
4. E.g. Section 3, Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) (Scotland) Regulations 2012. http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/sdsi/2012/9780111016718/contents (accessed 12 October 2014).
5. In coalition 2000–2003 and 2007–2011, with the Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru,
respectively.
6. Under Economic and Social Research Council Awards No: R000239410 and L219252016.
7. Thus, engagement and governing party turnover are the dependent and independent
variables, respectively.
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8. i.e. Systems with free and fair elections.
9. ‘Groundhog Day’ – a 1993 film directed by Harold Ramis concerning a time loop – cited
here as a simile for repetition.
10. In this sense, the present findings echo the experience elsewhere. For example, in Bavaria
where, even with direct democracy mechanisms such as local referendums, limited turn-
over of the governing party is amongst factors that limit the agenda setting of CSOs
(see Premat, 2012: 169).
11. In this respect, the findings resonate with potential issues in Bavaria, another ‘regional’
European polity characterised by limited governing party turnover where government
has invested significant political capital in developing state–civil society engagement
(cf. Raffl, 2014).
12. Reference to Hans Christian Andersen story – here meaning CSOs were afraid to be
critical of government.
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